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RECENT DECISIONS 
ADMINISIRATIVE LAW-JUDICIAL REVIEW-RIPENESS FOR REVIEW OF AN 
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION ORDER-In order to operate in interstate 
commerce, motor carriers must obtain a certificate of public necessity and 
convenience from the Interstate Commerce Commission and must obey the 
Interstate Commerce Act.1 However, motor vehicles used in carrying" ... 
agricultural . . . commodities (not including manufactured goods) . . .": 
may operate free of the act. The commission on its own initiative in-
vestigated the meaning of the term "agricultural commodities," and after 
two years published a seventy-one page list classifying certain commodities 
as within or not within the exemption.3 Petitioner, an interstate trucker 
of various commodities listed as non-agricultural, sought to enjoin the 
classification and have it set aside. A three-judge district court dismissed 
the action, saying the "order" of the commission was not subject to judicial 
review.~ On appeal, held, reversed, one justice dissenting.5 The order has 
an immediate and practical effect on petitioner; it is not abstract or 
theoretical and the issues raised are justiciable. Frozen Food Express v. 
United States, 351 U.S. 40 (1956). 
For an order of an administrative agency to be reviewable by a federal 
court, it must arise from a case or controversy0 and be final.7 Traditionally 
an order was final, or ripe for review, when it represented the last action to 
be taken by an agency in determining the rights of a party.8 An order was 
final when it required a party to do, or to stop doing, something. Such an 
order was called "affirmative" and was held to be reviewable. Thus, an 
order of the Interstate Commerce Commission determining the value of 
particular railroad property was not a final order for judicial review.11 
Such an order was "negative" because it did not require the railroad to do, 
1 Part II of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 Stat. 543 (1935), 49 U.S.C. (1952) 
§§306 (a), 309 (a), and 315 to 318. 
2 49 Stat. 543 (1935), 49 U.S.C. (1952) §303 (b). 
3 "Determination of Exempted Agricultural Commodities," 52 I.C.C. Reports, Motor 
Carrier Cases, 511 (1951). 
4 Frozen Food Express v. United States, (D.C. Tex. 1955) 128 F. Supp. 374. 
~ Justice Harlan dissented on the ground the order was not the final action of the 
commission, and there was no immediate harmful impact on petitioner. 
6 U.S. CoNST., art. III, §2. 
7 28 U.S.C. (1952) §1336; 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. (1952) §1009. 
8 See Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125 at 130 (1939), and cases 
cited therein. See also Schwartz, "A Decade of Administrative Law: 1942-1951," 51 MICH. 
L. REv. 775 at 844 (1953), for a discussion of "final orders." 
o United States v. Los Angeles &: S.L. R. Co., 273 U.S. 299 (1927). This is the most 
frequently cited case on the question of whether or not an administrative order is ripe for 
review. The following passage, beginning on page 309, was quoted in the principal case 
at p. 43 and in the district court opinion, note 4 supra. "The so-called order here com-
plained of is one which does not command the carrier to do, or to refrain from doing 
anything; which does not grant or withhold any authority, privilege or license .••. [I]t is 
the exercise solely of the function of investigation." 
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or refrain from, any act. When the commission, however, used this value 
as a basis for an order determining the rates the railroad must charge, then 
this rate order was "affirmative" and reviewable.10 The Supreme Court 
did away with the distinction between affirmative and negative orders in 
Rochester Tel<;phone Corp. v. United States,U where an order by the Fed-
eral Communications Commission that petitioner telephone company was 
subject to its authority was held reviewable. This order was negative since 
it merely determined status, but the telephone compai;iy could show an im-
mediate practical injury because the order meant it must comply with 
F.C.C. regulations. In other words, the effect of the order· upon petitioner 
was the basis for review. As to the requirement that an order must, to be 
reviewable, arise from a case or controversy, the court must consider whether 
or not petitioner is raising only a hypothetical question, for if he is, there 
is in fact no controversy.12 This is the case when the court is asked to re-
view regulations and interpretations which petitioner claims will be illegal 
if and when the issuing agency attempts to enforce them. Even in these 
cases, however, the Supreme Court has reviewed definite regulations when 
tlie penalties for violation were extremely severe,13 or when petitioner can 
show an immediate and irreparable practical harm from the mere issuance 
of the .regulations.14 The Court has been tom benveen its desire to offer 
protection from harmful administrative action and its fear of becoming 
overburdened with hypothetical judicial questions. Generally, the less 
final an order is in the traditional "affirmative-negative" sense, the greater 
the immediate injury to petitioner must be for the order to be reviewable.15 
Recent cases illustrate the difficulty of applying such an indefinite test. 
The Court has refused to review regulations of the Civil Service Commis-
sion prohibiting political activity by government employees although peti-
tioners had only the choice of obeying the regulations or risk losing their 
10 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Stickney, 215 U.S."98 (1909). 
11 See note 8. supra. The history of the negative-order doctrine is traced and admin-
istrative orders on the various types which the federal courts have jurisdiction to review 
are classified. For an extended discussion of. this case, see DAVIS, .ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 
648-652 (1951). 
12Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450 at 461 (1945). It has 
long been this Court's" •.• considered practice not to decide abstract, hypothetical or con-
tingent questions .•.. " See cases there cited in support of this statement. 
13 Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Under the Passenger Rate Act disobedience 
in respect to the established rates rendered the offending railroad liable to a fine up to 
$5,000 and the railroad's officers liable to imprisonment for a maximum of five years. The 
Court held the petitioner was being deprived of due process because he was unable to 
challenge the rate regulations by violating them without the possibility of incurring 
severe penalties. 
14 Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942). The network 
showed that independent radio stations were refusing to enter into network contracts 
because of the existence of Federal Communication Commission regulation~. 
16 Davis, "Ripeness of Government Action for Judicial Review," 68 HARV. L. REv. 
1122-1153, 1326-1373 (1955). This is an excellent review of almost all available cases in 
the field. 
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jobs.18 On the other hand the Court allowed a review of the results of a 
preliminary investigation which placed petitioner's name on the attorney 
general's subversive list.17 The Court admitted the presence of real and 
immediate injury to petitioner from the mere issuance of the report. 
While the decisions have been apparently inconsistent, most writers feel 
that the Court is taking an ever increasing role in reviewing administrative 
orders.18 The principal case clearly bears out this contention. A com-
parison of facts will .show the principal case to be a substantial extension 
of the cases cited by the majority opinion.10 The "order" of the principal 
case is an interpretation of a statute. It is a warning to carriers that they 
may expect the Interstate Commerce Commission to treat certain com-
modities as non-agricultural. The order is not directed to a particular 
carrier, and does not establish status as in the Rochester Telephone case.20 
The Court states the order has an immediate impact and touches vital in-
terests of carriers. However, the order does not change the liability of peti-
tioner, for if the commission charges a violation of the agricultural excep-
tion clause, it must afford petitioner a hearing, in which a principal issue 
would be the meaning of "agricultural commodities." The order of the 
principal case classifying commodities would be used only as prima fade 
evidence of violation in any such hearing.21 The only harm to petitioner 
may arise from an increased possibility that the commission will prosecute 
petitioner on the grounds that its products are not within the agricultural 
exception, according to the I.C.C. classification. No prior case has been 
found which allowed review of an administrative report which is as far 
10 United Public Workers, C.I.O. v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947). This case involved 
the Hatch Act and regulations of the Civil Service Commission prohibiting political activ-
ity of various types. Many of these regulations have yet to be tested, as government work-
ers have complied with what may be an unconstitutional restriction of their political 
rights rather than take a chance on losing their jobs. Accord: Standard Computing Scale 
Co. v. Farrell, 249 U.S. 571 (1919); Eccles .v. Peoples Bank of Lakewood Village, Calif., 
333 U.S. 426 (1948); International Longshoremen's Union v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222 (1954). 
17 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951). Cf. Hynes 
v. Grimes Packing, 337 U.S. 86 (1949). 
18 For the theories of various writers, see Carrow, "Judicial Intervention to Restrain 
Pending and Threatened Administrative Action," 1 HOWARD L.J. 63 (1955), and Davis, 
"Ripeness of Government Action for Judicial Review,'' 68 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1122-1153, 1326-
1373 (1955). 
10 The majority opinion distinguishes the Los Angeles & S.L. R. case, note 9 supra, and 
cites Rochester Telephone case, note 8 supra, and Columbia Broadcasting System, note 14 
supra, in support of its conclusion. 
20 See note 8 supra. 
21 In a companion case to the principal case, East Texas Motor Freight Lines v. 
Frozen Food Express, 351 U.S. 49 (1956), the complainant freight line had applied to the 
Interstate Commerce Commission to stop defendant carrier from transporting frozen 
chicken, as this was not an exempted agricultural commodity under the "order" of the 
principal case. The commission held a hearing and allowed new evidence aside from its 
"order" before determining if a cease and desist order should be issued for violation of 
the Interstate Commerce Act. 
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from being final as the principal case, with so little showing of immediate 
substantial and irreparable harm. It seems clear this case is opening the 
way for judicial review of informal reports and administrative declarations 
if only some degree of immediate and future harm can be shown. 
Robert Knauss 
